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In Gabaix (2008) , some results of which I report here, I formulate a variable-intensity version of the rare disasters hypothesis, and investigate the impact of time-varying disaster intensity on the prices of stocks, bonds, options, and the predictability of their returns. A later companion paper (Emmanuel Farhi and Gabaix 2008) studies exchange rates, and proposes a theory of the forward premium puzzle.
In the model, the value loss suffered by assets in a disaster varies both in the cross-section and over time. Hence, assets have time-varying risk premia, which generates volatile prices. When agents are optimistic about stocks (and think they will do reasonably well during disasters), stock premia are low, stock valuations are high, and future returns are low. But this optimism changes over time. This yields a time-varying risk premium which generates a time-varying price-dividend ratio, and "excess volatility" of stock prices. It also makes stock returns predictable via measures such as the dividend-price ratio.
Variable Rare Disasters: A Tractable Theory of Ten Puzzles in Macro-Finance
By Xavier Gabaix* This way, the following patterns are not puzzles, but they emerge naturally when the model has two shocks: one real, for stocks, and one nominal, for bonds: (a) equity premium puzzle; (b) risk-free rate-puzzle; (c) excess volatility puzzle; (d) predictability of aggregate stock market returns with price-dividend ratios; (e) value premium; (f) often greater explanatory power of characteristics than covariances for asset returns; (g) upward-sloping nominal yield curve; (h) a steep yield curve predicts high bond excess returns and a fall in long term rates; (i) corporate bond spread puzzle; (j) high price of deep out-of-the-money puts.
The model is presented as rational, but it can be also viewed as a tractable way to model less orthodox things, such as "time-varying perception of risk," or "investor sentiment." 1 I conclude that the rare disaster hypothesis, augmented by a time-varying intensity of disaster, is a workable additional paradigm for macro-finance. Indeed, within the class of rational, representative-agents frameworks, it may be viewed as a third workable paradigm, along the external habit model of John Campbell and John Cochrane (1999) , and the long-run risk model of Ravi Bansal and Amir Yaron (2004) . Using the linearity-generating processes of Gabaix (2007) , the model is very tractable, and all prices are in closed form.
I. Model Setup

A. Macroeconomic Environment
The environment follows Rietz (1988) , Francis Longstaff and Monika Piazzesi (2004) , and Barro (2006) , and adds a stochastic probability and intensity of disasters. I consider an I consider a typical stock i, which is a claim on a stream of dividends 1D it 2 t$0 , which follows:
. 21 is a mean zero shock that is independent of whether there is a disaster. This shock matters only for the calibration of dividend volatility. In normal times, D it grows at a rate g iD . But, if there is a disaster, the dividend of the asset is partially wiped out, in a way captured by F i, t11 $ 0. I introduce the notion of "resilience" H it of asset i,
When the asset is expected to do well in a disaster (high F i, t11 ), H it is high-investors are optimistic about the asset. In the cross section, an asset with higher resilience H it is safer. I specify the dynamics of H it directly, rather than by specifying the individual components, p t , B t11 , F i, t11 . I postulate that H it hovers around 2 Gabaix et al. (2003 Gabaix et al. ( , 2006 , and whether there is a disaster, are uncorrelated variables. Equation (3) means that H it mean-reverts to H i* at speed f H , but as a "twisted" autoregressive process. The "twist" term 11 1 H i* 2/ 11 1 H it 2 is close to one, and the process is an AR(1) up to second-order terms. It makes the process very tractable. It is best thought as economically innocuous, and simply an analytical convenience, which will make prices linear in the factors, and independent of the functional form of the noise.
II. Equilibrium Asset Prices and Returns
The next proposition calculates stock prices and expected returns. The key innovation in Proposition 1 is that it derives the stock price with a stochastic resilience H it . As expected, more resilient stocks (higher H it ) have a higher price, and a lower expected return. As resilience H it is volatile, price-dividend ratios are volatile, in a way that is potentially independent of innovations to dividends. Hence, the model generates a timevarying equity premium, hence "excess volatility," i.e., volatility of the stocks unrelated to cash-flow news. Hence, the model generates predictability in stock returns, given by (5). 
Derivation of (4)
.
III. Calibration and Return Predictability
A. Postulates I use yearly units, and take g 5 4, d 5 0.045, g c 5 0.025. The probability and conditional intensity of macro disasters are constant, and are taken from Barro (2006) . The disaster probability p 5 0.017. I take E 3B 2g 4 5 10, for a certain-equivalent recovery rate of consumption is E 3B 2g 4 21/g 5 0.56. Disaster events get a weight that is ten times their risk-neutral weight (see Martin Weitzman (2007) for an even higher weight).
I set s D 5 0.11, and f H 5 0.15. The variability of the recovery rate F t is s F 5 0.11.
B. implications
Average Levels.-The normal-times equity premium is R e 2 r f 5 p 1E 3B 2g 4 11 2 F * 2 2 5 5.3 percent. The unconditional equity premium (i.e., in long samples that include disasters) is 4.5 percent. The central price/dividend ratio is P/D 5 18 (equation (4) when H ^ t 5 0).
"Excess" Volatility.-As stock market resilience H it is volatile, stock market prices, and P/D ratios, are volatile. Volatile resilience yields a volatility of the log of the price / dividend ratio equal to 9.2 percent. The volatility of equity returns is 14.3 percent. I conclude that the model can quantitatively account for an "excess" volatility of stocks.
Predictability.-When H ^ t is high, (5) implies that the risk premium is low, and P/D ratios (4) are high. Hence, when the market-wide P/D ratio is low, stock market returns will be higher than usual. Consider the predictive regression of the return from holding the stock from t to t 1 t, r t S t1t , on the initial P/D ratio: r t S t1t 5 a t 1 b t ln 1P t /D t 2 1 noise.
In the model, for small holding horizon t's, the slope is, to the leading order: b t 5 1r i 1 f H 2t. Using the paper's calibration of r i 5 5 percent and f H 5 15 percent, this predicts a slope coefficient b 1 5 0.20 at a one-year horizon, in line with the return predictability literature. Gabaix (2008) derives similar expressions, and analytics of predictability regressions, for bonds and options.
IV. Conclusion
This paper sketches some results from Gabaix (2008) , which yields a tractable way to handle a time-varying intensity of rare disasters, and derives its impact on stock and bond prices, and its implication for time-varying risk premia and asset predictability. I was surprised by how many finance puzzles could be understood with the lens of such a simple model. Given that the model is quite simple to state and to solve in closed form, it can serve as a simple benchmark for various questions in macroeconomics and finance. on the other hand, the model does suffer from several limitations, and suggests several questions for future research.
First, it would be interesting to examine empirically the predictions of the model on the joint behavior of stocks, bond, and options.
Second, linking updates of resiliences to development in the real economy (e.g., political upheaval, state of the business cycle) is important.
Third, a companion paper (Farhi and Gabaix 2008) suggests that various puzzles in international macroeconomics (including the forward premium puzzle) can be accounted for in an international version of the present framework.
Fourth, I used an endowment economy. In ongoing work, I show how to embed the rare disasters idea in a production economy, in a way that does not at all change its business cycle properties, but changes its asset pricing properties. It is possible, because the disaster framework uses the same isoelastic utility as the rest of macroeconomics. Hence, the rare disasters idea may bring us closer to the long-sought goal of a joint, tractable framework for macroeconomics and finance.
